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One of the most interesting events in the recent history of the
American character evidence doctrine was the Bush Administration's
proposal of Federal Rules of Evidence 413-15.1 Today we are privi-
leged to have with us Mr. David Karp, one of the Justice Department
officials instrumental in drafting that proposal. As his remarks indi-
cate, the proposed rules would significantly change the character evi-
dence doctrine.
2
On the one hand, I agree with Mr. Karp that it is appropriate to
consider changing the doctrine. The character evidence prohibition
has long been a target of criticism by thoughtful commentators.3
More recent developments, however, make this an especially apropos
time to consider this topic. To begin with, there is a growing realiza-
tion that the rigid American character evidence prohibition is out of
step with the more liberal doctrines in effect in other progressive com-
mon-law jurisdictions such as England. 4 Moreover, the latest psycho-
logical research suggests that character evidence may be more
probative than we have traditionally assumed it to be.5 For both of
these reasons, we should rethink the policy underlying the firm
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis School of Law. This article contains
the prepared text of an address presented to the Evidence Section of the Association of Ameri-
can Law Schools ("AALS") on January 9, 1993.
1. For a discussion of the content of the proposed rules, see David J. Karp, Evidence of
Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and Other Cases, 70 CKI.-KENT L. REV. 15
(1994).
2. See id
3. Richard B. Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts Evi-
dence, 66 IowA L. REV. 777 (1981); H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct
Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845 (1982).
4. P.B. Carter, Forbidden Reasoning Permissible: Similar Fact Evidence a Decade After
Boardman, 48 MOD. L. REV. 29 (1985); Rupert Cross, Fourth Time Lucky-Similar Fact Evi-
dence in the House of Lords, 1975 C IM. L. REV. 62.
5. See Susan M. Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct A Reassessment of Rele-
vancy, 27 Crwm. L. BuLL. 504 (1991). See also David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other
Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offence Cases, 78 MiNN. L. REV. 529, 561-65 (1994); Thomas J. Reed,
Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Sex Offender Cases,
21 AM. J. CRiM. L. 127, 146-56 (1993).
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prohibitions on character evidence codified in Federal Rules of Evi-
dence 404-05.
On the other hand, after some thought, I believe that at this junc-
ture, it would be unwise to adopt the proposed Federal Rules. The
proposed rules would relax the character evidence doctrine beyond
the point to which it has been liberalized in other common-law sys-
tems. Further, it would be premature to premise any major altera-
tions of the doctrine on the new line of psychological research. To be
sure, we should carefully monitor that ongoing research and be more
open-minded about the possibility of revising the character evidence
prohibition. However, the case has not yet been made for the type of
fundamental change embodied in the proposed rules.
I. THE STATUS Quo AS A COMPROMISE POSITION
At first blush, the choice appears to be between two polar ex-
treme positions. At one extreme is the status quo, the character evi-
dence prohibition in Rules 404-05. With few exceptions, those
statutes firmly forbid litigants from using a person's character as cir-
cumstantial proof of conduct.6 Under Rule 404(b), if the litigant pro-
poses introducing evidence of a person's uncharged misconduct, the
litigant must ordinarily identify a noncharacter theory of logical rele-
vance.7 Seemingly at the other extreme is the Bush Administration's
proposal to abolish the prohibition at least in certain categories of
cases. As Mr. Karp tells us: "the proposed rules of admissibility mean
what they say. Evidence admitted under the rules could be consid-
ered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant. This includes
questions of the defendant's propensity or disposition to commit sex
crimes." 8
However, it is a mistake to conceive the choice in these terms. In
truth, the current doctrine is a compromise position occupying the
middle of the spectrum of possibilities. Professor Lewis made that
point emphatically in his noted 1989 article.9 Like Mr. Karp, Profes-
sor Lewis points out that the courts frequently admit uncharged mis-
conduct. 10 He asserts that as administered by the courts, the rule is
strongly biased in favor of admitting evidence impugning the ac-
6. See FED. R. Evm. 404.
7. See FED. R. Evro. 404(b).
8. Karp, supra note 1, at 18.
9. D. Craig Lewis, Proof and Prejudice: A Constitutional Challenge to the Treatment of
Prejudicial Evidence in Federal Criminal Trials, 64 WAsH. L. REV. 289 (1989).
10. See generally id.
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cused's character." He urges revising the rule to toughen the eviden-
tiary standard to make admission the exception rather than the rule.12
His proposal-rather than Rules 404-05-is the polar extreme to the
Bush Administration's proposal.
In contrast, Rules 404-05 represent a compromise position. As
Mr. Karp twice acknowledges, there is an underlying "tension" in this
doctrinal area-a tension generated by the competing interests in ef-
fectively enforcing penal laws and ensuring the accused a fair trial.13
The current rules give both interests substantial protection. The rules
certainly do not ignore the former interest. As Mr. Karp and Profes-
sor Lewis have both noted, in many cases the test set out in Rule
404(b) proves flexible enough to permit the jury to be informed of the
accused's past misdeeds; 14 and that information substantially increases
the probability of the accused's conviction. I suspect that Mr. Karp
would also agree that the current rules are more protective of the ac-
cused's interests than the proposed rules. Mr. Karp may believe that,
in large measure, that protection is undeserved; but that measure of
protection exists under Rules 404-05.
Most prosecutors would contend that Professor Lewis' position
depreciates the interest in vigorous law enforcement. In the same
vein, many defense counsel would undoubtedly argue that proposed
Rules 413-15 slight the accused's interest in a fair trial. Both sides
charge that the current Rules 404-05 are unduly solicitous of the other
side's interest. I lecture on Rule 404(b) for both the National College
of District Attorneys and the National Association of Criminal De-
fense Lawyers, and I frequently hear these charges. Both sides com-
plain about the current rules precisely because those rules embody a
compromise position which balances and respects both interests.
Adopting the proposed rules or Professor Lewis' position would not
simply shift us from one polar extreme view to another; instead, it
would move us from a centrist compromise to one of the extremes.
Adopting proposed Rules 413-15 would not only shift us to an
extreme position; the proposed rules would also push us well beyond
11. Id. at 348.
12. Id. at 352.
13. Karp, supra note 1, at 30-31.
14. Id. at 32; Lewis, supra note 9, at 293 n.12, 323-24, 341-42, 356. See Lynn A. Helland et
al., An Asymmetrical Approach to the Problem of Peremptories: A Rebuttal, 30 CRIM. L. BuLL.
242 (1994) (an article coauthored by three federal prosecutors). The authors state that the im-
pact of the character evidence prohibition codified in Rule 404(a) is "minor." Id. at 250 n.13.
They explain that "the practical effects" of the prohibition are "minor" precisely "because the
many legitimate uses of prior bad acts evidence authorized under Rule 404(b) mean that the
most relevant evidence of a person's bad character is still presented to the jury." Id.
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the extent to which other common-law jurisdictions have been willing
to liberalize the character evidence prohibition. It is true that the cur-
rent rules embody a more categorical prohibition than other jurisdic-
tions such as England recognize. In 1975 in R. v. Boardman,5 the
House of Lords rejected a rigid distinction between character and
noncharacter reasoning. 16 However, in their speeches in Boardman,
the Lords made it clear that they were sanctioning character reasoning
only when disposition has exceptional probative value in the case 17-
fact situations in which, for instance, the accused has committed a
number of strikingly similar uncharged acts. Boardman did not signal
the routine admission of character evidence. As one English com-
mentator puts it, "[1like Banquo's ghost," the character-noncharacter
distinction reappears in the English cases.18 Even after Boardman, in
the great majority of cases, the English courts have rejected character
theories of admissibility.19 Character theories are accepted only occa-
sionally20 when they possess the highest cogency.21 In addition, the
English courts have gone farther than the American courts in devel-
oping the doctrine of chances as a noncharacter theory of admissibil-
ity-using not only the version of the theory based on the objective
improbability of so many accidents but also employing the variation of
the theory based on the improbability of so many similar, false accusa-
tions against the same accused.22
To understand the role of the character evidence doctrine in
other common-law systems, it is critical to view the doctrine in con-
text-specifically, in the context of balancing probative value against
probative danger. In its most recent pronouncement on the subject,
the House of Lords in R. v. p.23 reiterated that the proponent has the
burden of convincing the trial judge that the probative value of the
15. 1975 App. Cas. 421.
16. Id. at 438-39. See T.R.S. Allan, Similar Fact Evidence and Disposition: Law, Discretion,
and Admissibility, 48 MoD. L. REv. 253 (1985); T.R.S. Allan, Admissibility of Evidence of Dispo-
sition Against the Defendant, 99 LAW Q. REv. 349 (1983); Cross, supra note 4.
17. Boardman, 1975 App. Cas. at 439, 444, 453. See Carter, supra note 4, at 30, 43.
18. Allan, Similar Fact Evidence and Disposition, supra note 16, at 263.
19. Carter, supra note 4, at 30, 43.
20. It. at 43.
21. T.R.S. Allan, Accomplice's Evidence of Similar Facts: Proof or Prejudice?, 47 CAM-
BRIDGE L.J. 29, 31 (1988).
22. See Boardman, 1975 App. Cas. at 444. But see Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Small Contri-
bution to the Debate Over the Proposed Legislation Abolishing the Character Evidence Prohibi-
tion in Sex Offense Prosecutions, 44 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1125 (1993) (noting that the Michigan
Supreme Court endorsed the English version of the doctrine of chances in footnote 35 of its
opinion in People v. VanderVliet, 508 N.W.2d 114 (Mich. 1993)).
23. [1991] 3 All E.R. 337.
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evidence outstrips any attendant probative dangers. 24 Federal Rule
403 allocates the burden quite differently. The Advisory Committee
Note to the 1990 amendment of Rule 609 purports to clarify Rule
403.25 That note makes it clear that Rule 403 assigns the risk of non-
persuasion to the opponent and that the opponent must convince the
trial judge that the incidental probative dangers "substantially" out-
weigh the probative value.26 As Professor Lewis notes, many courts
had adopted that construction of Rule 403 even earlier.27 The net re-
sult is that while the English courts usually reject character reasoning
even after Boardman, that reasoning would generally be acceptable
under the proposed Rules 413-15. Mr. Karp's remarks confirm that.
He quotes the analysis statement for the proposed Sexual Assault Pre-
vention Act28 which declares: "It is not expected ... that evidence
admissible pursuant to proposed Rules 413-15 would often be ex-
cluded on the basis of Rule 403 .... The presumption is in favor of
admission." 29
It just so happened that when Professor Nance asked me to speak
at this program, I was in the midst of preparing an article on character
evidence for the Anglo-American Law Review at the University of
Bristol.30 I discussed and quoted proposed Rules 413-15 in the draft
article. I received comments from the editor, Professor Partington,
and the reviewer to the effect that I did not understand how signifi-
cantly the proposed rules differ from the contemporary character evi-
dence doctrine in England. Their comments were that the wording of
the proposed rules goes "well beyond Boardman" and purportedly al-
lows the introduction of "a whole range of prejudicial ... evidence"
which English courts would exclude. Those comments should give us
pause. In light of those comments and the compromise nature of the
current rules, we should embrace the proposed rules only if the case
for their adoption is compelling. It is not.
24. See id.
25. FED. R. Evro. 609 (advisory committee's note to the 1990 Amendment).
26. Id.
27. Lewis, supra note 9, at 293.
28. H.R. 5960, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); S. 3271, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
29. Karp, supra note 1, at 19 (quoting unpublished analysis statement).
30. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Evolution of the Uses of the Doctrine of Chances as The-
ory of Admissibility for Similar Fact Evidence, 22 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 73 (1993).
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II. THE WEAKNESS OF THE CASE FOR OVERTHROWING
THE STATUS Quo
Mr. Karp correctly points out that the underlying assumption of
the American character evidence prohibition is that lay triers of fact
will misuse character testimony in the technical sense that they will be
inclined to overestimate its probative value.31 He questions that as-
sumption and points to two types of evidence that factfinders can ac-
curately assess and properly utilize character testimony: judicial
experience and empirical research.3 2
Judicial experience. Mr. Karp suggests that we can look to judi-
cial "experience" as some evidence that triers of fact will not over-
value character testimony.33 He states that there is a widespread
judicial tendency to be "inclined to admit evidence of other sex crimes
by the defendant in sex offense prosecutions. '34 He regards this ten-
dency as proof of judicial experience which is more trustworthy than
an "a priori" presumption that "particular categories of evidence are
... prejudicial. ' 35 There are several flaws in that suggestion.
First, although at one time there may well have been a judicial
consensus that one way or another uncharged misconduct evidence
should be admitted in sex offense prosecutions, 36 that consensus is er-
oding. In several jurisdictions in which there was decisional authority
allowing the admission of uncharged misconduct to establish an ac-
cused's lustful disposition, courts have held that the authority is no
longer good law after the passage of an evidence code patterned after
the Federal Rules. 37 Other jurisdictions have decided as a matter of
common law to overrule that authority.38 One decision, Lannan v.
State,39 was rendered by the Indiana Supreme Court in October 1992.
The court noted that in the past, many courts had carved out a special
lustful disposition theory for admitting uncharged misconduct evi-
31. Karp, supra note 1, at 22.




36. See Reed, supra note 5.
37. See, e.g., Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988); State v. Aybach, 761 P.2d 1334 (Or. Ct.
App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 775 P.2d 318 (Or. 1989).
38. See, e.g., People v. Thornton, 523 P.2d 267 (Cal. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 924 (1975);
Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 685 S.W.2d 549, 552 (Ky. 1985). See also State v. Lachterman, 812
S.W.2d 759, 766-67 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1666 (1992). In 1994, after the
addresses by Mr. Karp and Professor Imwinkelried at the A.A.L.S. convention, the Missouri
legislature enacted Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.025, explicitly allowing character evidence.
39. 600 N.E.2d 1334 (Ind. 1992).
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dence;40 indeed, the court referenced some of the cases cited by Mr.
Karp.41 However, even after considering those cases and evidence of
recidivism rates among sex offenders, the court opted to abandon the
lustful disposition exception. 42
Second, even if the consensus were still intact, it would be ques-
tionable to treat the existence of the consensus as persuasive evidence
that triers of fact can accurately value character evidence. There are
obvious explanations for the existence of the old consensus other than
a widespread judicial belief that triers of fact are competent to gauge
the probative worth of character testimony. There are other factors at
work. The Lannan court points out that many of the old decisions
were driven by a felt need to admit evidence to corroborate the com-
plainant's testimony about a secretive crime.43 Mr. Karp himself
states that the need for uncharged misconduct evidence "appeared [to
many courts] to be particularly exigent" in sex offense prosecutions.
4
In the final analysis, many of the reasons advanced for expanding the
admissibility of character evidence are anti-crime arguments 45 resting
on social policy-arguments having little or nothing to do with theo-
ries about the probative worth of character testimony. It is one thing
to demonstrate that there are many cases straining to justify the ad-
mission of uncharged misconduct in sex offense cases, but it is another
matter to infer a widespread judicial perception that character is
highly predictive of conduct.
Empirical research. In addition to asking us to eschew reliance
on "a priori" assumptions about jurors' ability to evaluate character
evidence, Mr. Karp invites us to consider the empirical studies of ju-
rors' ability.4 Although there is little discussion of those studies in
the text of Mr. Karp's remarks, in footnote 32 he cites the earlier Jus-
tice Department report entitled The Admission of Criminal Histories
at Trial.47 That report discusses the studies at some length and chal-
lenges the assumption that psychological data supports the finding
40. Id at 1335.
41. See Lannan, 600 N.E.2d at 1335-36. But see Ind. Stat. Ann. § 35-37-4-15 (1994).
42. Lannan, 600 N.E.2d at 1337.
43. Id.
44. Karp, supra note 1, at 30.
45. See Marshall McKusick, Techniques in Proof of Other Crimes to Show Guilty Knowledge
and Intent, 24 IowA L. Rav. 471, 477 (1939).
46. Karp, supra note 1, at 27.
47. ld. at 20 n.32 (citing Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep't of Justice, The Admission of
Criminal Histories at Trial, 22 U. MICH. J.L. RF. 707 (1989) [hereinafter Histories].
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that laypersons routinely overestimate the value of character
evidence.
48
Since the release of that report, another article has been pub-
lished which presses the same argument, Ms. Davies' 1991 article.49
Her article is highly relevant to our topic today. At the outset of her
article, Ms. Davies mentions the previous articles reviewing the psy-
chological literature.50 By and large, those articles concluded that the
research data indicates that character is a poor predictor of conduct.51
However, Ms. Davies contends that psychologists are now reassessing
the earlier research.
52
After mentioning the earlier legal articles, she describes the
evolution of the psychological research on this issue.5 3 As she points
out, in the 1950s the trait or generality theory was dominant. 4 The
gist of the theory is that each person has stable character traits which
produce "consistent behavior in widely divergent situations. '55 Ac-
cording to this theory, even when there is only a "miniscule sample[ ]
of [the person's] prior behavior," it is possible to draw a trustworthy
inference as to character and then to use that inference as the basis for
a further, reliable inference as to the person's conduct on a particular
occasion. 5
6
Ms. Davies then notes that the trait theory came under sharp at-
tack in the 1960s and 1970s-when the Federal Rules of Evidence
were being drafted.57 Mischel led the assault on the trait theory and
championed the competing theory of situationism.58 Mischel argued
that there was little empirical support for assuming cross-situational
consistency.59 The situationist theory posits that environmental fac-
tors or external stimuli largely determine conduct.60 Situationist the-
orists denied that persons possess relatively permanent character
48. Histories, supra note 47, at 732-33.
49. Davies, supra note 5, at 504. See also Bryden & Park, supra note 5, at 561-65; Reed,
supra note 5, at 146-56.
50. Davies, supra note 5, at 505.
51. See, eg., Miguel A. Mendez, California's New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence
Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1003 (1984). See
also Edward J. Imwinkelded & Miguel A. Mendez, Resurrecting California's Old Law on Char-
acter Evidence, 23 PAC. L.J. 1005 (1992).
52. Davies, supra note 5, at 506.
53. Id. at 511-23.
54. Id. at 504.
55. Id. at 513.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 514-15.
58. Id. at 514.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 515.
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traits which are predictive of conduct even in highly similar situa-
tions.61 Based on situationism, some legal commentators urged that
character evidence has absolutely "no probative value" on the ques-
tion of a person's conduct on a specific occasion.62
However, Ms. Davies adds that just as trait theory gave way to
situationism, situationism has waned.63 Today the prevailing theory is
interactionism. 64 The interactionist theory is that a person's conduct
is a function of both the person's disposition and the situation or envi-
ronment.65 Interactionists believe that if there is a sufficient sample of
the person's behavior in similar situations, the person's conduct in an
analogous situation can be accurately forecast on the average. 66 As
Ms. Davies explains, interactionist theory is not only inconsistent with
the situationist theory dominant when the Federal Rules were drafted;
the theory also cuts in favor of liberalizing the character evidence pro-
hibition 67 and moving in the general direction which Mr. Karp has
advocated.
However, there are two important caveats. Even if we take con-
temporary interactionist theory at face value, the proposed rules go
much farther than that theory warrants. First, interactionists empha-
size that you need a large sample of instances of the person's conduct
in similar situations to draw a reliable inference as to the person's
character trait. Most are of the view that a trustworthy inference can-
not be drawn "on the basis of one or two observations of behavior
I...."68 However, the proposed rules would permit a trier of fact to do
precisely that. Mr. Karp tells us that the rules mean what they say;6 9
and if they do, they mean that a prosecutor would be permitted to
introduce a single other instance of the accused's behavior and urge
the jury to draw a character inference and make a prediction of con-
duct based on that inference. A scrupulous interactionist would balk
at drawing that inference and making that prediction.
Second, we should perhaps be hesitant to legislate on the basis of
the current popularity of the interactionist theory. As Ms. Davies
states, trait theory had a large number of adherents until the mid-
61. Id.
62. See Robert G. Spector, Commentary: Rule 609-A Last Plea for Its Withdrawal, 32
OKLA. L. REV. 334, 351 (1979).
63. Davies, supra note 5, at 515.
64. See id. at 518.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 517-20.
67. Id. at 519.
68. Id.
69. Karp, supra note 1, at 18.
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1960s.70 In a relatively short time-a little more than a decade-situa-
tionism both came into and went out of vogue. 71 Interactionism is
now the most widely followed theory; but it is hardly as well estab-
lished a psychological theory as, for example, some of the propositions
about the frailties of human memory. Given the rather quick rise and
fall of the trait and situationist theories, we would be well advised to
wait until there is further research data solidifying interactionism.
CONCLUSION
The Bush Administration's advocacy of proposed Rules 413-15
has done a real service to both the bar and evidence scholars. The
mere proposal serves to remind us that just as the United States en-
forces a more rigid version of the hearsay rule than most common-law
jurisdictions apply,72 we have a more categorical character evidence
prohibition than is currently in effect in other common-law systems.
Federal Rules 404-05 erect a virtually "absolute bar" against character
reasoning;73 unless the defense overreaches and the prosecution can
invoke curative admissibility, the prosecution is "never" permitted to
introduce uncharged misconduct evidence on a character theory of
logical relevance. 74 In Boardman, the Lords rejected that view.
75
They argued that the admissibility question should turn on the degree
of probative value rather than simply the kind of probative value.
76
It is therefore time to rethink the American jurisprudence of
character evidence. However, it probably is not yet time to enact pro-
posed Rules 413-15. The growing recognition of the doctrine of
chances as a noncharacter theory acceptable under the current Rule
404(b) certainly reduces the need to adopt the proposed rules.
77 If
enacted, those rules would commit us to an extreme view; those rules
would relax the character evidence prohibition beyond the point per-
mitted by other common-law systems. The advocates of the proposed
rules certainly have not yet constructed a compelling case based on
the available empirical data. Concededly, the interactionist theory
70. Davies, supra note 5, at 513.
71. Id. at 514-15.
72. See MirJan Damaska, Of Hearsay and Its Analogues, 76 MINN. L. REV. 425 (1992).
73. United States v. Arias-Montoya, 967 F.2d 708, 709 (1st Cir. 1992) (referring to Rule
404(b)).
74. People v. Honey, 596 P.2d 751 (Colo. 1979).
75. See Boardman, 1975 App. Cas. 421.
76. Id. at 427-28.
77. See Imwinkelried, supra note 22.
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lends impetus to the movement to relax the prohibition.78 However, it
is questionable whether that theory has crystallized to the point that it
can serve as a firm basis for legislative change. Moreover, just as the
proposed rules sweep beyond the reforms effected in other common-
law jurisdictions, the rules exceed interactionist theory; interactionists
demand a substantial sample of behavior before inferring a character
trait, and the proposed rules would allow a prosecutor to invite that
inference based even on a single, isolated act.
Long ago Professor Kenneth Culp Davis urged evidence reform-
ers to adopt a "full-bodied" empirical approach.79 Evidence scholars
have slowly moved in that direction. The interactionist theory is
promising; and if it fulfills its promise-if future research gives a bet-
ter sense of the size of the sample of behavior needed to draw a relia-
ble character inference and the degree of similarity needed to assure
cross-situational consistency-it will be time to adopt legislation such
as proposed Rules 413-15. That time has not yet arrived.
78. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
79. Kenneth C. Davis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXr § 15.03, at 297 (3d ed. 1972).
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